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How Real People Make Long-Term Decisions:





A canonical but untested assumption in economics is that choices are determined
only by preferences and budget constraints, but not by how people approach decision
making. In particular, it is believed that people behave “as if they optimized”, even
if they do not engage in any formal planning. We test this empirically in the domain
of retirement saving using a specifically designed survey. We find that people who
rely on a rule of thumb indeed behave like literal planners/optimizers. However,
people without any systematic approach save substantially less. We discuss the
implications of this finding.
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1 Introduction
Economists typically assume that choices are the outcome of optimization over consump-
tion in the presence of a budget constraint. Agents are assumed to identify the choice
that leads to the highest satisfaction out of all feasible choices. In many domains, this
optimization process is fairly straightforward, most notably for choices that do not in-
volve long time horizons or substantial uncertainty. In contrast, in the domain of life
cycle saving, literal optimization requires engaging in contingent planning and backward
induction. Indeed, most economists agree that people do not literally engage in optimizing
in this domain. Rather, there is consensus that people’s behavior should be understood
“as if” determined by an optimization process. This intriguing idea has been a powerful
justification for understanding individuals’ life cycle savings by means of the classical life
cycle model. Interestingly, though, economists have remained surprisingly vague about
what “as-if” optimizing would mean in practice.
The first aim of this paper is to fill this gap from an empirical perspective. We con-
sider three potential prototypes of decision processes that may underlie the logic of the
“as-if” optimizing perspective on life cycle saving. We dub the first prototype the plan-
ning approach. While real individuals are unlikely to engage in backward induction and
contingent planning, their plan may well come close to literal optimization by making
scenario-based budget calculations, based on financial software or expert advice. We dub
the second prototype the rule-of-thumb approach. In contrast to the planning approach,
some individuals may not actually engage in any formal planning process. Rather, they
may follow some simple rules of thumb such as putting aside a fixed percentage of their
monthly earnings. Finally, some individuals may not engage in any planning at all nor
consciously follow any specific rule. We dub the latter non-systematic approach to retire-
ment saving the random approach.
The second aim of the paper is to contribute to the explanation of the huge variation
in retirement wealth among U.S. households. It has been observed by Bernheim et al.
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(2001) that it is rather difficult to explain this pattern with a variation in variables that
serve as inputs of the canonical life cycle model. Our aim is to explore whether part of the
variation in retirement wealth can be explained by heterogeneity in decision processes.
Bernheim et. al. (2001) posit that observed variation in wealth at retirement is likely
to be caused by deviations from “rational, farsighted optimization” and that differences
are more consistent with a rule of thumb. However, previous research has not had access
to data that could directly measure whether individuals follow a plan based on farsighted
optimization or instead follow a simple rule of thumb or even exhibit a random approach
to life cycle saving. For our analysis, we use a novel data set that has been collected for
the purpose of this study. These data allows us to categorize individuals according to the
three prototypes mentioned above by means of specifically designed survey questions. We
first examine whether all of the three prototypes can actually be observed. We investigate
their relative frequency as well as the determinants that lead individuals to adopt either
prototype. The main topic of the paper is then to explore whether all three prototypes
of decision processes lead to comparable savings outcomes or whether they are associ-
ated with systematic differences in outcomes. In particular, we examine whether these
approaches to decision making have a causal effect on accumulated retirement wealth.
We define a decision process to consist of a series of steps that one takes to make a
choice. According to the three prototype decision processes, this could include complicated
calculations akin to the life cycle model, adopting simple rules of thumb, or no systematic
approach. Crucially, decision processes differ in terms of the degree of their sophistication
and therefore how costly they are to implement. Gathering detailed information for
working out a careful plan may require a substantial amount of time. In contrast, copying
a simple rule of thumb from a friend does not require any time investment. Importantly,
the costs of working out a careful plan my differ across individuals. It may require little
effort for someone with substantial mathematical or accounting skills. On the other hand,
it may be very burdensome to people with low planning skills and to those with a high
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disutility from thinking about economic issues.
Decision processes should be distinguished from preferences over consumption profiles.
Intertemporal preferences determine the optimal choice of lifetime consumption profiles.
However, since decision processes may be costly, some individuals may make choices that
differ from the first-best choice that they would make if decision making were costless.
To understand the logic of this view, consider a person’s income profile and prefer-
ences over intertemporal consumption streams which imply a unique first-best retirement
savings choice. Suppose, however, that this first-best choice is unobserved by the person,
due to bounded rationality. Instead, the person can invest motivational and cognitive
resources and spend time in order to learn about the optimal savings choice. It is the
amount of time and effort invested in finding an approximation to the first-best savings
choice that relates to someone’s decision process. Different decision processes may lead
to different retirement savings choices. According to this logic, individuals with identical
preferences over intertemporal consumption streams may easily make different choices if
they differ in terms of cognitive abilities or the propensity to plan. An interesting ques-
tion is, therefore, whether different decision processes will lead to systematic differences
in choice outcomes.1
The classical argument against the relevance of decision processes is due to Milton
Friedman (1953). As is well known, Friedman invented the metaphor of a billiard player
who may have an excellent intuition about the movements of balls without being able to
solve the differential equations describing these movements. Instead, he hits the balls “as
if” he knew these equations. In a similar way, people may have a good intuition about the
distribution of financial returns, inflation, the effect of compound interest, as well as their
desired expenditures while retired. As a result, they may behave “as if” they optimized
1It is important to stress that we do not aim to dispense with the view that observed choices should
be understood as the outcome of an optimization process. Rather, we adopt the perspective that choices
should be understood as originating from optimization over both intertemporal consumption streams
and over decision processes. Our data allow us to investigate whether different decision processes lead to
different outcomes.
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by means of a careful plan, even if the do not engage in any explicit planning at all. This
essentially pins down to the view that bounded rationality is not an issue for life cycle
saving. Put differently, it would mean that there are no meaningful differences in the
costs of implementing different decision processes or there is no meaningful heterogeneity
in those costs across individuals, contrary to the view spelled out above.
There are three main justifications of Friedman’s view. First, people may, like a billiard
player, have had the opportunity to learn about retirement saving by means of trial and
error. However, in the domain of retirement saving, feedback on the quality of one’s
decisions comes with a substantial lag, limiting the scope for learning. Second, people
may simply observe the actions of others who have had the skills to derive a careful plan
and copy them. Third, those incapable of working out an appropriate plan may simply
seek expert advice.
Whether the simple cost-benefit model that we have described above or rather Fried-
man’s view better corresponds to reality is, ultimately, an empirical question. Our survey
allows us to compare households that follow a plan similar to life cycle maximization to
those who do not. We can thus investigate whether individuals who do not follow such a
plan actually end up making similar choices, thus behaving “as if” they were optimizing.
Our data come from a detailed survey module on decision behavior that we fielded
with the American Life Panel at the RAND institution. Our module consists of questions
on how individuals proceeded when making their retirement savings decisions, as well as
questions on choice outcomes and individual characteristics. In contrast to our module,
traditional economic data sets typically contain only the latter two.
We present two main findings. First, the planning and rule-of-thumb approaches are
associated with substantially higher retirement wealth accumulation than the random
approach. We also provide evidence that this reflects a causal effect of decision processes
on wealth accumulation. Second, we do not find any statistically significant difference
between the outcomes for planners and rule-of-thumb savers. Thus, rule-of-thumb types
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behave as if they were planners. This suggests that a rule of thumb may be a very
effective devise for retirement saving for individuals who find working out a careful plan
too demanding.
Our analysis relates to the paper of Bernheim et al. (2001) which investigates to what
degree the variables that serve as input for the standard life cycle model can explain
observed variation in retirement wealth. They find that these variables explain only
a little of the variation in retirement wealth and suggest that it may be explained by
heterogeneous decision processes, instead. In our paper we directly address this issue.
Our paper is also related to the papers of Ameriks et al. (2003), and Lusardi and
Mitchell (2007). Both investigate the role of planning for wealth accumulation and find
that planning does indeed have an economically significant effect on wealth accumulation.
The main difference between these two papers and our own is our aim to investigate
multiple decision processes rather than just “planning.” In particular, we address the
question whether adopting a simple rule of thumb leads to a similar amount of wealth
accumulation as working out a careful plan. This question is important from a policy
perspective. The reason is that advice in the form of a simple rule of thumb may be
easier for some people to adopt than the advice to derive a sophisticated plan. Second,
our analysis allows us to take a stand on whether people behave “as if” they optimized
even if they do not engage in planning. Although central to theoretical and methodological
debates, this issue has not been addressed from an empirical perspective, so far.
Rodepeter and Winter (2003) provide an in-depth discussions of the literature on rule-
of-thumb behavior in the domain of life cycle saving and simulate the outcomes resulting
from various rules of thumb. While many authors have considered the use of a rule of
thumb for savings2, to our knowledge we are the first to measure their prevalence or their
effect on wealth accumulation using micro-data. The importance of planning has been
discussed in the psychological literature, in particular by Gollwitzer (1999) and Gollwitzer
2See, for example, Simon (1955), Hall (1978), Deaton (1991, 1992), Browning and Crossley (2001).
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et al., (2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data and outlines
the definitions of decision making types used for analyzing the data. Section 3 investigates
the relationship between types and retirement wealth accumulation and retirement savings
flows. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Data
2.1 The American Life Panel
Our data come from a survey module conducted with the RAND American Life Panel
(ALP). Our module was fielded in August 2008. All respondents in our sample participate
in the labor market.
The ALP provides us with information on respondents’ background characteristics
such as age, gender, education etc. Our measure of income is top-coded at $200,000; five
percent of observations fall into this category. In the regression analysis reported below
we use a dummy variable as an indicator for those observations.
Table 1 includes information about the main demographic variables. Our sample is
slightly older and better educated than the general population. However, this may be a
more relevant group for understanding retirement planning and wealth accumulation.
2.2 The Measurement of Types and Retirement Wealth
As already mentioned in the introduction, we categorize individuals into three types of
decision behavior. The categorization is based on four questions that are stated below.3
3As mentioned in the introduction, there are two further papers that analyze how planning affects
wealth accumulation. Ameriks et al. (2003) use a definition of planning that is based on the question:
I have spent a great deal of time developing a financial plan. (Responses are stated on a 6-point Likert
scale.) Alternatively, they also use the question: Have you personally gathered together your household’s
financial information, reviewed it in detail, and formulated a specific financial plan for your household’s
long-term future? (The answer is yes or no). Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) use as their measure of planning
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(PLAN1) I’ve tried to determine my financial needs during retirement. (Re-
sponses: 5-point Likert scale.4)
(PLAN2) Have you ever tried to find out how much you should save in total
today and in the coming years in order to finance your target needs during
retirement? (Responses: yes, no.)
(ROT1) I have a saving target of regularly saving some percentage of my
income, e.g. 5, 10, 15, or . . . percent. (Responses: 5-point Likert scale.)
(ROT2) I have a saving target of regularly saving some amount of money,
e.g. $100, $500, $1000, or . . . per month. (Responses: 5-point Likert scale.)
According to the responses to these questions, we define the following types:
• Planner type: Answer to PLAN1 is either somewhat or fully agree and answer to
PLAN2 is yes.
• Rule-of-thumb type: Answer to ROT1 or ROT2 is either somewhat or fully
agree and respondent is not a planner type.
• Random type: The residual category, not qualifying for either the planner or
rule-or-thumb type.
Note that, by construction, the three types are mutually exclusive. Table 1 shows
that roughly one third of the observations falls within each category. Table 2 shows
summary statistics for the four variables above separately for each of the three types. As
expected, the mean of PLAN1 is lowest for random types and highest for planners. The
the question: How much have you thought about retirement? A lot, some, a little, or hardly at all? In
comparison to both studies’ measures of planning, our measures zoom in into the decision process in
somewhat more detail. In addition, our measure of rule-of-thumb decision making is novel.
4A 5-point Likert scale consists of the response categories: fully disagree, somewhat disagree, neither
agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, fully agree.
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three means are significantly different from each other at either the five- or one-percent
level, as indicated in the right part of Table 2. The average for rule-of-thumb types is 3;
on average, they are neutral with respect to the question whether they have determined
their financial needs during retirement. Thus, the evidence points clearly to the fact that
rule-of-thumb types have thought less about their retirement than planners.
By construction, the means of PLAN2 are zero for random and rule-of-thumb types.
Both planners and rule of thumb savers tend to agree that they have some regular savings
target (variables ROT1 and ROT2 ). There is thus evidence that planners may use their
plan to derive a well-founded rule of thumb. Thus, for planners, a rule-of-thumb can be
seen as the outcome of a careful plan, while for rule-or-thumb types it cannot. Interest-
ingly, a t-test for equality of means points to no significant difference between planners
and rule-of-thumb types for ROT1. The difference is significant only at the 10-percent
level for ROT2.
Table 3 shows a correlation matrix for the variables PLAN1, PLAN2, ROT1, ROT2.
The correlation is highest for PLAN1 and PLAN2, amounting to .58. While this corre-
lation is substantive, it is clearly far lower than one. This points to the fact that PLAN1
and PLAN2 measure different things. In fact, it is relatively easy to try to determine
financial needs during retirement by using current expenditures as a starting point. It
is much harder to calculate how much one would have to save in order to finance those
retirement needs. This is consistent with the pattern in our data that, among those who
either somewhat or fully agree to the PLAN1 question, only 56 percent answer yes to the
PLAN2 question.
Our most important decision outcome variable is accumulated retirement wealth. In-
formation about retirement wealth is obtained from the answer to the following question:5
(Wealth) What is the total amount of wealth you have accumulated so far
5Thirty nine out of the 443 observations of our regression sample did not provide a direct answer to
this question but provided an answer through follow-up questions using unfolding brackets. Exclusion of
these observations does not affect our results.
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for the purpose of retirement preparation, including both accounts like 401k or
IRA and also any other types of accounts or forms of retirement saving?
Note that this question refers exclusively to retirement wealth, not overall wealth. Table 1
shows that the mean balance of retirement wealth is equal to 188,000 whereas the median
is equal to 62,500. Wealth holdings are thus skewed, as is usually the case.
Our analysis makes use of additional variables measuring the flow of savings, time and
risk preferences and other characteristics. More information about those variables can be
found in the Appendix.
2.3 Characteristics of Decision Types
We conclude this section on our data with a descriptive analysis of the determinants
of decision types. Table 4 shows the results from a multinomial regression with the
type categorization as the dependent variable. We find that individuals who took any
economics courses during high school or college are more likely to fall into the rule-
of-thumb or planner category. The positive coefficients for the variable health research
indicate that respondents who engage in more research when making a health decision are
also significantly more likely to fall into the rule-of-thumb or the planner category.6 The
variable Health research is intended to measure to what degree someone is a “proactive”
decision maker in general. This variable is comparable to similar one on the attitudes
towards vacation planning used by Ameriks et al. (2003).
We also find that having access to a DC plan is associated with a higher probability
of having a rule of thumb. It is conceivable that having access to a 401(k) plan induces
people to adopt a rule of thumb since contributions to 401(k) plans are often framed as
a fixed percentage of pay. Men and higher income individuals are more likely to fall into
both the rule-of-thumb and planner categories. It is interesting to observe that college or
6See the Appendix for the wording of the health research question.
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graduate level education do not have any significant influence on types, everything else
equal. The same holds for time and risk preferences.
3 Decision Types and Saving for Retirement
This section presents our results. The first column in Table 5 shows an OLS regression
with the log of retirement wealth as the dependent variable. The main explanatory
variables of interest are dummies for planners and rule-of-thumb types. The excluded
category is the random type. The coefficients for planners and rule-of-thumb types are
both significantly different from zero at the one-percent level. An important result is
that equality of the coefficients for planners and rule-of-thumb types cannot be rejected
at conventional significance levels. The magnitude of both coefficients is very large. The
estimates imply that rule-of-thumb types are associated with a 2.5 times higher level of
retirement wealth than random types. For planners, the respective figure is 3.7.
Looking at the control variables, we find that having access to a DC plan has a
substantial effect on wealth accumulation. Interestingly, also the coefficient for DB plans
is positive.7 It may be that merely having access to a pension plan of any type leads people
to prepare for their retirement as it makes the need to do so more salient. Alternatively,
individuals with a DB pension may have an unobserved taste for retirement preparation.
Further significant variables are age, income, home ownership, being male, and having
a college or advance degree beyond college. Our measures for time and risk preferences
are not significant. This is consistent with similar findings of Ameriks et al. (2003) and
Bernheim et al. (2001).
One possible concern is that retirement wealth and decision types may be determined
by a third factor: the need to privately prepare for retirement. This need is crucially
affected by the magnitude of the replacement rates that someone can expect from Social
7Our results are robust to excluding individuals who have access to DB plans. Tables are available
from the authors.
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Security. Some individuals may be entitled to high replacement rates and, as a result,
there is no need to accumulate much private wealth. Thus, there may also be no need to
engage in planning or to follow a rule-of-thumb. The opposite may hold for individuals
facing low Social Security replacement rates.
In order to filter out the confounding influence of Social Security replacement rates, the
regression reported in the second column of Table 5 includes a proxy for the Social Security
replacement rate. The calculation of this proxy follows the procedure applied by Scholz
et al. (2006).8 As expected, the coefficients for planners and rule-of-thumb types become
smaller. However, their magnitude is still substantial. The estimates imply that rule-of-
thumb types are associated with a 2.3 times higher level of retirement wealth than random
types. For planners, the respective figure is 3.4. Equality of the two coefficients again
cannot be rejected. The coefficient on the Social Security replacement rate is negative
and highly significant. The coefficient on income becomes smaller, due to the fact that
income is correlated with Social Security replacement rates.
Controlling for Social Security replacement rates is likely to bring us closer towards
identifying a causal effect from decision types on wealth accumulation. However, one
may still be concerned about a potential endogeneity problem for several reasons. First,
there may be reverse causality. This may occur because higher levels of wealth trigger
interest in planning or because financial advisors target clients with higher levels of wealth.
Second, we do not observe whether a respondent anticipates a large bequest. Expecting
a major bequest would reduce the need to accumulate retirement wealth and hence the
need for working out a retirement preparation plan or for following a strict rule-of-thumb.
According to this logic, our random types may be exactly those who anticipate high
bequests. Third, our time and risk preferences may not fully measure individuals’ true
risk and time preferences. Thus, an individual with a particularly high discount rate, in an
unmeasured dimension, may wish to accumulate a high amount of wealth and, as a result,
8See their Appendix C.
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work out a careful plan. This plan is then only instrumental and should not be taken as
causing high wealth. In order to address these issues, we apply an instrumental variable
strategy and treat the variables planner and rule of thumb as endogenous variables.9
Valid instruments should be variables that are correlated with decision types but that
do not have any direct effect on the accumulation of retirement wealth. In other words,
the correlation of the instruments with retirement wealth should be fully “explained”
by the decision type variables. We use four variables as instruments: a dummy if they
took economics courses, the number of economic courses, self-assessed math confidence,
and health research. (See the Appendix for the definition of these variables.) The two
economics courses variables are proxies for interest in economics and financial issues and
thus negatively related to the disutility – and hence the subjective costs – of planning.
Most people in our survey completed their education long ago, but retirement savings
choices are more recent. This reduces any potential problems arising from simultaneity.
A higher level of confidence in one’s mathematical abilities is also likely to lower the
costs of planning and makes it less painful. The latter instrument has also been used
by Ameriks et al. (2003). Finally, we take the variable health research as a proxy for
measuring a “proactive” approach to decision making.
One concern with the variable math confidence may be that this measures, to some
degree, mathematical ability. One may argue that mathematical ability may have a
direct effect on wealth accumulation in that someone with high math skills may figure
out the optimal wealth accumulation strategy without any formal planning. However, the
retirement savings decision is a very complex one and even people with high mathematical
skills find it nearly impossible to master involved compound interest rate calculations in
their mind. We therefore believe that if mathematical ability has an effect on wealth, this
effect materializes through planning. Thus, confidence in one’s mathematical skills may
9Our endogenous variables are dummy variables. It should be noted, however, that the instrumental
variable approach leads to consistent estimates independent of the fact whether the endogenous variables
are binary variables or not. See Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 5). As a robustness check, we consider a
continuous score variable which does not qualitatively affect our results.
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reduce the disutility of planning but because of the complexity of retirement planning,
mathematical skills are unlikely to directly impact wealth. Hence, we take math confidence
as a valid instrument, even if it may be correlated with math ability.
The instrumental variable regressions are reported in the third and fourth column
of Table 5. (The respective first-step regressions are reported in Table 6.) The null-
hypothesis of joint insignificance of the instruments in the first-stage regressions is rejected
at least at the five-percent level. Furthermore, Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score test of
overidentifying restrictions indicates that the instruments are valid. The IV results are
very similar to the OLS results, except that the coefficients on the decision variables
are even larger. As in the OLS regressions, equality of the coefficients for planners and
rule-of-thumb types cannot be rejected.
In sum, our analysis leads to two main results. First, individuals without any sys-
tematic approach towards decision making save substantially less than the other types.
Second, rule-of-thumb types behave as if they were planners. Thus, following a simple rule
of thumb is, on average, as effective for wealth accumulation as following a sophisticated
plan. In light of Table 2, the latter finding comes as a surprise. Clearly, rule-of-thumb
types have invested significantly less time in retirement planning than have planner types.
Thus, there is a real underlying difference in the way both types approach retirement sav-
ing. However, this does not lead to any difference in decision outcomes, contrary to what
one would expect from a more psychological perspective on decision making.
The finding that rule-of-thumb types behave as if they were planners complements the
earlier results of Ameriks et al. (2003) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) who found that
literal planning (in the sense of our planner variable) causes higher wealth accumulation.10
10Our findings concerning literal planning are very much in line with the ones reported by Ameriks
et al. (2003). These authors also report OLS and IV estimations for the effect of planning on wealth
accumulation. As in our case, they also find that the coefficient for their planning variable is larger for IV
estimations than for OLS estimations. The similarity of their results with respect to planning strongly
suggests that their findings from their highly educated TIAA-CREF sample extend to samples that are
more representative for the general population such as ours. In contrast to our study, Ameriks et al.
(2003) do not have any information about rule-of-thumb behavior.
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Given that many people may lack the cognitive skills to work out sophisticated plans, our
novel finding that a simple rule of thumb may be as effective for wealth accumulation is
very welcome. It suggests that the capacity of accumulating a high amount of retirement
wealth is not a privilege of only particularly cognitively able individuals who are likely
to represent a minority of the population. Recall that planner types make up only about
one third of our sample.11
The finding that rule-of-thumb types behave as if they were planners or optimizers
is also highly important with regard to economists’ methodological approach of viewing
individual choices as if they were the outcome of a careful planning/optimization process
(Friedman, 1953). Our results show that, empirically, this is true for a substantial fraction
of the population. The channel through which this occurs may be the following. Planner
types may actually use their plan to calibrate simple savings rules for monthly or annual
saving. Planners may talk about their savings rules to their friends and colleagues. In
this way, the use of these rules may spread to people who have not themselves worked out
a plan. Our data indicate that 82 percent of planners do save a fixed percentage of their
income or a fixed absolute amount per month or year. Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that
the differences in means of the variable ROT1 is not significantly different for planners
and rule-of-thumb types. This is fully consistent with the channel described above.
Our evidence in favor of Friedman’s view is only partial, however, since decision types
do matter. Planners and rule-of-thumb types accumulate substantially more wealth than
random types. Thus, taking decision types into account is indeed important for explaining
the variation in observed retirement wealth.
In addition to looking at the stock of retirement wealth, it is also valuable to consider
the flow of retirement savings. Savings may fluctuate more over time and ultimately what
will matter is the total wealth accumulated. However, savings rates can shed light on the
more immediate effects of decision processes. The results are shown in the fifth to eighth
11Of course, our results do not allow us to take any stand on the adequacy of individual decisions.
Thus, it is conceivable that both planners and rule-of-thumb types save too much.
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column in Table 5. The fifth and sixth column report OLS estimations – without and
with controlling for Social Security replacement rates –, whereas the seventh and eighth
column report IV estimations – again without and with controlling for Social Security
replacement rates. (See the right half of Table 6 for the respective first-step regressions.)
The results are similar to the regressions for retirement wealth. In general, fewer
variables are significant. This is consistent with the view that savings flows are more
volatile and it is therefore harder to achieve significance than in the case of retirement
wealth. The coefficients for planners and rule-of-thumb types are always significant at
the five- or one-percent level and quantitatively substantial. As in the case for retirement
wealth, the coefficients for the decision variables are higher for the IV estimations than for
the OLS estimations. In none of the regressions can equality between the coefficients for
planners and rule-of-thumb types be rejected. These results confirm the earlier findings,
that planners and rule of thumb types are significantly different from the random savers,
but have similar outcomes to each other.
In order to test the robustness of our results, several other measures of planning and
decision making were used. These included the raw variables used to identify planners
and rule-of-thumb types, a score based on those variables, and other variables contained
in the data set. For example, individuals were asked if they “planned very carefully in
order to prevent any avoidable changes in [their] standard of living.” The results of these
other estimations are qualitatively similar to those presented here and are available from
the authors upon request.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed whether the adoption of different decision making pro-
cesses leads to systematically different levels of accumulated retirement wealth. Interest
in this question arises for two main reasons. First, previous research has found that vari-
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ables related to the classical life cycle model do not explain much of the observed variation
in retirement wealth. Second, addressing this question relates to a fundamental method-
ological issue in economics: whether or not decision processes are relevant for decision
outcomes. Famously, Milton Friedman suggested that decision processes are irrelevant.
He argued that, even if some (or the majority of) people did not literally optimize by
means of a careful planning process, their behavior would nevertheless look “as if” they
had made a careful plan.
Our results provide a partial justification of Friedman’s view. We have found that rule-
of-thumb types accumulate an amount of wealth that is statistically indistinguishable
from the amount accumulated by planner types. Thus, the behavior of rule-of-thumb
types indeed looks “as if” it were derived from a careful plan. This finding is novel and
may be very welcome since, for a substantial part of the population, understanding the
logic of a sophisticated plan may be rather difficult. On the other hand, we find that
planner and rule-of-thumb types accumulate substantially more retirement wealth than
the remaining category that we have dubbed random. Thus, decision processes do matter.
The random type category counts for about one third of our sample. Hence, the behavior
of a substantial fraction of the population does not look “as if” it is derived from a careful
plan. Because of this, variation in decision behavior does indeed contribute to explaining
part of the variation in observed retirement wealth.
Our results suggest two main implications for policy making. First, it is important
to be aware that people use different processes to make retirement savings decisions. In
particular, random types may react to changes in pension policy differently from the
other types. Economists should try to account for heterogeneous decision types in their
theoretical models. This is all the more an issue given that all three decision making
categories are substantial in size. In particular, the category of random savers amounts
to at least one third. Second, our results show that simple rules of thumb are a powerful
device for accumulating retirement wealth. This suggests that it may be very helpful
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to spread information about simple rules of thumb that lead to an adequate level of
retirement wealth for a range of representative cases. This may lead to a spread of
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Appendix: Additional Variable Definitions
Savings Flow
We measure the annual flow of savings by means of the following question.
(Savings) In the last year, how much did you save in total for the purpose
of retirement preparation? Please include both accounts like 401k or IRA and
also any other types of accounts or forms of saving for retirement (e.g. bank
accounts or mutual funds).
Respondents are then ask to report their answer in one of three possible formats of their
choice: (i) as a percentage of income; (ii) as an amount of money per month; (iii) as an
amount of money per year. Since we know individuals’ income, we convert the answer into
a percentage of income for all observations. The mean savings rate amounts to 9 percent,
whereas the median savings rate is 6 percent (see Table 1). The standard deviation is
equal to 17 percent. Thus, the variation of savings rates is substantial.
Time Preferences
Following Barsky et al. (1997), Kapteyn and Teppa (2003) and Binswanger and Schunk
(2008), we measure time preferences as the preferred slope of a consumption profile when
comparing working-age with retirement consumption. Specifically, respondents are pre-
sented with the following question and a table similar to the one below, customized for
each respondent.
(Time preferences) Suppose you would have a choice between the following
options of how to spend the money you earn during lifetime. Which option
would you like most? (Please answer the question as if prices remained con-
stant, i.e. if there were no inflation.)
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Monthly spending during working life (age
25 until retirement) in U.S. dollars
Monthly spending during
retirement in U.S. dollars)
Option A 2950 1900
Option B 2900 2200
Option C 2800 2500
Option D 2750 2750
Option E 2650 3200
Option F 2600 3600
The numbers in the above table are just an example as they are calculated based on
each respondent’s total household income.12 Here, they correspond to a monthly income
after taxes of $3,000. For all respondents, the ratio of retirement spending relative to
working-age spending is constant within a given row. Specifically, the ratios are equal
to 64, 76, 88, 100, 120, and 140 percent, respectively, up to rounding. The order of the
options were randomized with half of respondents seeing the options arranged with the
ratios in increasing order – as in the table above – and half of respondents seeing them
arranged in decreasing order. For a given respondent, our variable time preference takes
on the value of the ratio of old-age to working life consumption. For instance, it takes
on a value of one if a respondent has chosen option D. The mean of the variable time
preferences amounts to .98, the median to 1 and the standard deviation to .24.
Risk Aversion
The questions on relative risk aversion stem from another module that has been fielded
with the ALP in 2009, the so-called Cognitive Economics Survey.13 Relative risk aversion
12See Binswanger and Schunk (2008) for details.
13The Cognitive Economics (CogEcon) Survey has been designed by a team of economists led by
Robert J. Willis (University of Michigan), and is administered by John McArdle (University of Southern
California). The CogEcon survey aims to collect data that allow for studying the link between cognitive
factors and economic behavior. It has been fielded with the American Life Panel at the RAND institution,
among other platforms. See https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php/Data (“Well Being 48” and “Well
Being 50”) for the respective codebook.
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is inferred from a series of questions that read as follows.
(Relative Risk Aversion) Suppose that you unexpectedly inherited one mil-
lion dollars from a distant relative. You are immediately faced with the op-
portunity to take a one-time risky, but possibly rewarding, investment option
that has a 50-50 chance of doubling the money to two million dollars within a
month and a 50-50 chance of reducing the money by [α] to X thousand dollars,
within a month. Would you take the risky investment option or not?
On a first screen, α is equal to one third and, hence, X = 667. If a respondent answers
yes, then she is faced with the same question again, except that α is reduced to one half.
If the answer to this follow-up question is no, then no further question is asked. If the
answer is yes, then the question is asked again with α set to two thirds. If the answer
to the first question (with α equal to one third) is no, then α is increased first to .8 and
finally – if the risky option is declined again – to .9. The answers to these questions can
be used to infer upper and lower bounds for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We
set relative risk aversion equal to the mid-point between the upper and lower bound. For
those respondents that accept even the riskiest option (i.e. when α is equal to two thirds)
no exact lower bound on risk aversion can be inferred. We set the lower bound for these
observations to zero. Similarly, no upper bound can be inferred for those who decline
even the least risky option (i.e. when α is equal to .9). We set relative risk aversion to 10
for these observations, since this is considered as an upper bound for reasonable values
for this parameter. The mean of the resulting variable amounts to 5.23, the median to
5.7, and the standard deviation to 3.24.
Other variables
The remaining variables measure confidence in one’s mathematical skills, the researching
attitude in the domain of health decisions, and economics education. The question on
confidence in one’s mathematical skills reads as follows.
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(Math confidence) I am highly confident in my mathematical skills. (Re-
sponses: 5-point Likert scale.)
This question is taken from Ameriks et al. (2003). The mean of the math confidence
variable is 3.68, the median is 4, and the standard deviation 1.10. The question about
health research is intended to measure the degree to which someone is “proactive.” The
question reads as follows.
(Health research) When I have to make a decision about health care, I do a
lot of research to find out what all of the options are, e.g. on the internet or
in the library. (Responses: 5-point Likert scale.)
The mean of health research is 3.86, the median 4, the standard deviation 1.06. The
questions on economics education are borrowed from the CogEcon survey.
(Econ courses) During your school education (high school, college or gradu-
ate school) did you take any courses in economics or finance?
(N Econ courses) How many courses did you take?
The mean, median and standard deviation for the first question are 0.61, 1, and 0.49,
respectively. For the second question they amount to 2.05, 1, and 2.55, respectively.
For the wording of the additional questions used in our analysis, see https://mmicdata.rand.org/
alp/index.php/Data under “household information.”
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Median Standard deviation
Age 47.78 49 9.98
Male 0.49 0 0.50
Married 0.67 1 0.47
Children (dummy) 0.68 0 1.05
College 0.29 0 0.45
Advanced degree 0.26 0 0.44
Income 85,300 67,500 49,429
Income>200,000 0.05 0 0.22
House 0.78 1 0.41
Self-assess health 3.92 4 0.77
SS replac rate 0.50 0.45 0.21
DB plan (dummy) 0.49 0 0.50
Access DC plan 0.91 1 0.28
Retirement wealth 187,995 62,500 334,623
Retirement sav rate 9.62 6 17.01
Planner type 0.33 0 0.47
Rule-of-thumb type 0.32 0 0.47
Random type 0.35 0 0.48
Time preferences 0.98 1 0.24
Rel risk aversion 5.23 5.70 3.24
Math confidence 3.68 4 1.10
Health research 3.86 4 1.06
Econ courses 0.61 1 0.49
N econ courses 2.05 1 2.55
NOTE: Number of observations is 443. Self-assessed health, math
confidence and health research are measured on a five-point Likert
scale.
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Table 2: Summary of Classification Variables by Type
Variable Random Rule of
Thumb








I’ve tried to determine my fi-











Have you ever tried to find out
how much you should save in
total today and in the com-
ing years in order to finance











I have a savings target of reg-
ularly saving some percentage
of my income, e.g. 5, 10, 15, or










I have a savings target of reg-
ularly saving some amount of
money, such as e.g. $100,











NOTE: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. The numbers in the three last columns show t-values for a test for
equality of means between the two respective types indicated in the column header. One, two, and three asterisks indicate
that equality is rejected at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance level, respectively.
Table 3: Correlation matrix for the variables measuring types
PLAN1 PLAN2 ROT1 ROT2
PLAN1 1
PLAN2 0.58 1
ROT1 0.25 0.16 1
ROT2 0.33 0.23 0.43 1
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Table 4: Multinomial logit regressions predicting types
Role of thumb Planner
Econ courses 0.81** 0.65*
(0.35) (0.37)
N econ courses -0.13 0.02
(0.08) (0.07)
Math confidence 0.11 0.30**
(0.12) (0.13)
Health research 0.32*** 0.57***
(0.12) (0.14)
SS replac rate 0.02 -0.31
(0.74) (0.81)
DB plan 0.34 -0.13
(0.26) (0.27)
Access DC plan 1.40*** 0.82
(0.52) (0.53)
Time preferences -0.35 0.24
(0.53) (0.56)
Rel risk aversion -0.03 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)








Income > 200,000 -0.68 -0.20
(0.89) (0.82)















NOTE: Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. One, two, and
three asterisks indicate a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respec-
tively.
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Table 5: Regressions for retirement wealth accumulation and savings rates
Log retirement wealth Retirement savings rate
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Planners 1.32*** 1.24*** 2.88** 2.54** 5.41*** 5.37*** 18.17** 18.22**
(0.32) (0.32) (1.28) (1.21) (1.14) (1.14) (7.28) (7.29)
Rule of thumb 0.91*** 0.85*** 4.07** 3.35* 7.25*** 7.18*** 26.22** 25.99**
(0.33) (0.32) (1.92) (1.84) (1.75) (1.74) (12.80) (12.51)
SS replac rate -2.10** -2.12* -2.16 -3.11
(1.06) (1.08) (3.35) (4.25)
DB plan 0.82*** 0.78*** 0.63** 0.65** 1.78 1.72 -0.35 -0.30
(0.25) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30) (1.38) (1.38) (2.44) (2.37)
Access DC plan 2.04*** 1.90** 1.39* 1.38* 1.96 1.75 -3.43 -3.73
(0.72) (0.74) (0.81) (0.80) (1.62) (1.78) (3.93) (4.05)
Time preferences 0.27 0.25 0.46 0.42 1.92 2.10 2.71 3.02
(0.57) (0.56) (0.62) (0.58) (2.94) (3.03) (3.26) (3.32)
Rel. risk aversion -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Self-assess health 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.10 -0.26 -0.18 0.37 0.43
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.64) (0.64) (0.78) (0.78)
Age 0.34*** 0.30** 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.32 0.28 0.44 0.39
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.21) (0.32) (0.30)
Age2 -0.0031** -0.0027** -0.0039** -0.0033** -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0028
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0030)
Log income 1.42*** 1.12*** 1.13*** 0.89** -1.00 -1.32 -2.77 -3.23*
(0.37) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43) (1.32) (1.23) (1.93) (1.96)
Income > 200,000 0.60 0.65* 0.79 0.79* 15.72** 15.68** 17.02** 17.01**
(0.38) (0.38) (0.48) (0.45) (6.97) (6.96) (7.59) (7.54)
House ownership 1.51*** 1.44*** 1.34*** 1.32*** 0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.22
(0.45) (0.45) (0.48) (0.46) (1.99) (1.98) (2.24) (2.21)
Married -0.23 -0.08 -0.18 -0.06 1.31 1.59 1.72 1.94
(0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (1.31) (1.27) (1.67) (1.65)
Male 0.69*** 0.75*** 0.44 0.54 1.24 1.31 -0.05 0.03
(0.26) (0.26) (0.35) (0.33) (1.39) (1.40) (1.68) (1.68)
Children -0.14 -0.14 -0.06 -0.08 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.70
(0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.80) (0.80) (0.90) (0.90)
College 0.58* 0.45 0.55 0.42 1.36 1.36 1.48 1.44
(0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.32) (1.39) (1.40) (1.61) (1.62)
Advanced degree 0.94*** 0.73** 0.92** 0.69** 4.97*** 4.92** 4.23** 4.10*
(0.28) (0.29) (0.36) (0.34) (1.92) (1.97) (2.09) (2.10)
Constant -19.52*** -14.33** -19.70*** -14.43** -1.94 3.15 6.92 14.57
(4.68) (5.69) (5.05) (5.92) (13.56) (11.14) (16.78) (16.78)
N 443 440 443 440 449 447 449 447
R2 0.510 0.518 0.397 0.445 0.151 0.151 . .
NOTE: Results for first-stage regressions are shown in Table 6. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
One, two, and three asterisks indicate a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
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Table 6: First-step regressions for the instrumental-variable regressions in Table 5
Retirement wealth regressions Savings rates regressions
Without SS replac rate With SS replac rate Without SS replac rate With SS replac rate
Planner Rule of thumb Planner Rule of thumb Planner Rule of thumb Planner Rule of thumb
Econ courses 0.03 0.11* 0.03 0.11* 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
N econ courses 0.02** -0.03*** 0.02** -0.03*** 0.03*** -0.03*** 0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Math confidence 0.04** -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.05** -0.01 0.05** -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Health research 0.07*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SS replac rate -0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.15
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
DB plan -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09* -0.03 0.14*** -0.03 0.14***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Access DC plan 0.04 0.19** 0.03 0.19** 0.04 0.25*** 0.03 0.26***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Time preferences 0.08 -0.09 0.07 -0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.11 -0.12
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Rel risk aversion -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Self-assess health -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.00 -0.03* 0.00 -0.03* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Log income 0.08** 0.05 0.07** 0.06 0.08** 0.04 0.06 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) (0.04)
Income > 200,000 0.12 -0.14 0.12 -0.14 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.14
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
House ownership -0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Married 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Male 0.08* 0.04 0.08* 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Children 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
College -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Advanced degree 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant -1.26*** 0.39 -1.13** 0.28 -1.24*** 0.01 -0.94* -0.35
(0.48) (0.49) (0.53) (0.53) (0.44) (0.45) (0.50) (0.53)
R2 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.08
Prob > F 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NOTE: The first two columns relate to the second-step regression in the third column of Table 4. The third and fourth
column relate to the second step-regression in the fourth column in Table 4. The fifth and sixth column relate to the
regression in the seventh column in Table 4. The last two columns relate to the last column in Table 4. Robust standard
errors are indicated in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate a p-value less than .1, .05, and .01, respectively.
Prob > F indicates the joint significance of the instruments.
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